Williams Argument 

Williams argues that the demands of utilitarianism are “in the most literal sense, an attack on [one’s] integrity” (p. 117), given the seemingly boundless negative responsibility it implies as well as its implications on the autonomy of the individual. To begin, Williams defines the utilitarian outcome as depending “entirely on the facts, on what persons with what projects and what potential satisfactions are within calculable reach of the causal levers near which he finds himself”. Firstly, Williams establishes that utilitarianism implies negative responsibility. Given that agents have a duty to promote the good in a system, if Jim refrains from stopping Pedro from killing 20 Indians, Jim is also responsible for the outcome. Utilitarianism as an agent neutral moral theory assesses blameworthiness of agents based on their action or inaction towards the optimal outcome, assuming they have the capacity to influence it. All agents have equal duty to an outcome determined by the objective balance of goods and bads, and thus utilitarianism implies “boundless obligation” (p.110). On the other hand, it is worth noting that Williams claims that a moral theory mustn’t exempt actors from all obligations, just as in Jim’s case it would be “hard to think of anyone supposing” that Jim is exempt from any obligation to stop Pedro from killing (110). Williams draws a distinction in the moral significance between Jim having the capacity to stop a suboptimal outcome, and bringing that outcome about (109) just as Pedro has done. Jim did not make the killing happen, and thus did not bring about the outcome of the killings through Pedro, but rather Pedro brought the action of killing into being. Contrarily, utilitarianism assumes equal accountability to the outcome in a system where two agents have the causal levers to bring about or prevent that outcome. While it would be intuitive to assume Pedro is more accountable to the outcome than Jim, it is also intuitive Jim has some sort of obligation towards preventing the outcome. In order to understand where the line must be drawn an understanding of people’s priorities and moral projects must be understood.

 

People’s general moral frameworks consist of different levels of projects prioritized by “orders”. Part of these order might be an individual’s commitment to furthering specific causes that bring about good in the world, for example social justice, or more “general dispositions” such as a hatred of killing (111). A utilitarian assumes that the good must be pursued externally and is motivated by maximizing the objective external good of the world. Williams shows that individually and internally motivated ventures of happiness coincide with external commitments. This mediates utilitarians’ concern with ventures of maximizing happiness morphing into an egoist moral theory (113). In an attempt to derive an action guiding version of utilitarianism Williams recognizes that individuals naturally consider a plethora of projects and commitments when confronted with a situation. Given the negative responsibility inherent to utilitarianism Williams recognize that Jim’s individual actions must be determined by the projects of Pedro in order for him to bring about the favorable outcome.  This indefinite responsibility to the projects of others which are within your causal levers to influence is another example for the unlimited responsibility which utilitarianism recognizes. When projects conflict, utilitarians have the “absurd” demand of abandoning one’s own projects and commitments for the utilitarian decision (116). One’s integrity is thus threatened in two integral ways. Firstly there is an underlying issue where the assumption of equal autonomy amongst agents is threatened. We might ask ourselves why Pedro’s projects and commitments take precedence over Jim’s, but are met with a crucial utilitarian assumption that agents must have a first-order project of maximizing the good. While a fair assumption, the question thus becomes why must Jim be forced to abandon his commitments by virtue of Pedro’s goals. Jim is effectively reduced to a medium for other peoples projects. This alienation of one’s own “actions and the source of his actions in his own convictions” undermines one’s sense of self-perceived legitimacy in acting as an autonomous agent. Consequently, this threatens the integrity of agents. 

 

Example: Fated Twins

Assume two twins are born as moral polar opposites of each other. One of them, Clark, is the epitome of evil and is only capable of producing immoral acts. The other, Kal, is the epitome of heroism and is only capable of moral acts. Clark will grow up to harbor projects of world domination and the only individual capable of dissuading him from such projects is Kal. Kal has projects to bring about world peace and if allowed to do so can achieve such projects, however he must dedicate his life to these projects if they are to ever come into fruition. For the utilitarian, assuming expected consequentialism fulfills an action-guiding utilitarian theory rather than actual consequentialism, Kal must spend his life keeping Clark’s evil in check. From childhood to their dying day, Clark poses a threat to his causal fields, and it is within Kal’s causal levers to prevent these threats. Kal has forfeited a lifetime of goals, commitments, relationships and friendships, in order to keep Clark in check. Kal as being representative of the ultimate selfless good, by virtue of ascribing to the utilitarian good, is forced to alienate his actions and the source of his actions, effectively renouncing his autonomy to his brother’s projects. The demandingness of utilitarianism, in regards to its assumption of boundless responsibility thus threatens Kal’s integrity as an autonomous agent. On the other hand, it is worth noting that the utilitarian would aptly recognize that Kal has a principle of promoting the absolute good given his representation of the absolute good, a contention that will be important in my reply to the consequentialist reply. 

 

Consequentialist Reply  

Firstly, a statement about the good differs from a statement about accountability to the good or a statement about blameworthiness. When deriving a prescriptive dimension to utilitarianism it would be unreasonable for the consequentialist and non-consequentialist alike to hold individuals accountable to information and uncertainties that lie outside their scope. We must then take a position of expected consequentialism rather than actual. Given that expected consequentialism is contingent on the subjective perception and knowledge available to the individual, when ascribing to a system a utilitarian decision on the optimal outcome, we do so from an agent-neutral frame of reference. While the utilitarian decision for the optimal outcome might be agent-relative, thus equally and objectively considering each of the agent’s projects, the optimal decision for the subjective agent cannot be expected to be exactly the same as the one from the all knowing frame of reference of the system. While this utilitarian decision might prescribe a right or wrong decision, whether agents fulfill this exact requirement or not, assuming a conscious effort at maximizing the good, they are not blameworthy for not exacting the outcome. It might seem contradictory for a moral theory to prescribe something that opposes its identified good, however we must recognize that a claim about the good may differ about a claim about blameworthiness. In the case of Jim, his accountability to Pedro’s projects flows from Williams mechanization of blameworthiness from the utilitarian agent-neutral good, thus undermining expected consequentialism’s recognition of individual limitations. Given this distinction, a second dimension exemplified by Railton exists, that of the long run good. Railton posits that if the good in the long run is to maintain to develop a character that works to maximize the good, a character that alleviates itself from the detached consequentialist decision-process, and instead approaches morality personally and authentically, this would also represent a utilitarian good (Railton 211-244). While a clear contention would be that utilitarianism isn’t action guiding at all, it remains necessary for identifying the ultimate good, even if at the parsimonious expense of identifying the optimal path there. An important implication to this is that utilitarianism and actual consequentialism as inherent theories of the good rather than the actionable good, adapt to the conceivable scope of causality. Just as water must take the shape of a container, if the container grows or becomes smaller, the water must follow. Say we become aware of a parallel universe, which interacts with our own in an invisible yet causally drastic way. Utilitarianism, or more accurately actual consequentialism, as an impartial agent-neutral tool must accommodate the actual consequentialist good to the complete causal sphere, in which the “good” is the best outcome given both universes. However this doesn't mean that we are expected to now take on the grand burden of incorporating the now immeasurable causal impacts of our actions. Agents maximize the good by defining a workable sphere of moral duty. This distinction between actual and expected consequentialism recognizes that while an all encompassing good might be necessary and worthwhile to define, expected consequentialism as the actionable sect of utilitarianism preserves the projects and autonomy of the individual to act within the scope of his commitments and moral sphere.   

 

Non-Consequentialist Reply to this Contention 

To define a morality that lies outside the scope of humanity is analogous to defining absolute truths outside the scope of academics. If utilitarianism defines the actionable good as being relative to agent and his/her commitments then it has departed too far in principle from its agent-neutral good. If one is to preserve the utilitarian system determined good as an expected consequentialist, the agent must avoid the uncertainty that shrouds future projects and instead attempt to maximize the objective good in each situation.  Kal represents the ultimate utilitarian good, his selflessness and duty to the absolute good has lead him to adopt a miopic view on morality and attempt to preserve the good in every situation. His circumstances are relatively easy, for he has a defined evil he can dedicate his life to suppressing. However, this approach to morality would undermine the net good that Kal might have been able to bring about in the world if he focused on his commitments. This mythical hero however, differs drastically from a regular agent in terms of capacity to preserve the utilitarian good and the expected consequentialist decision process simultaneously. Kal as a regular agent would lose touch with the absolute good and his capacity to bring it about given that it is no longer sourced by his autonomous agency. 

 

Citations:

Railton, Peter. “11. Alienation, Consequentialism, and the Demands of Morality.” Friendship, 

1993, pp. 211–244., doi:10.7591/9781501741104-013.

 

Williams, Bernard. “Critique of Utilitarianism.” Bernard Williams, pp. 27–52., 

doi:10.1017/upo9781844653195.003.