In Mackie’s argument from relativity, he introduces a peculiar challenge to moral realists who believe in objective moral truths that exist independently of the beliefs and lived experiences of moral agents. The challenge lies in reconciling this objectivity with the phenomenon that our ecosystem of moral talk and study is riddled with moral disagreements amongst different cultures, time periods, and even individuals within the same community. If there exist objective moral truths that inspire our understanding of morality, and their existence is necessarily and naturally self-evident as to avoid a descriptively inaccurate meta-ethical theory of moral values that are epistemologically inaccessible to the regular moral knower, then why would we have so much disagreement across times periods and places? If we were to take on the naturalist realist view that all moral concepts can be explained by universalizable and reducible natural properties we would run into some shortcomings in its explanatory power of moral disagreement. Namely, this view would leave no room for the subjective influences of self-interest on an otherwise rigid and immovable moral structure. If every last person on earth were to hold the view that tripping the elderly was moral, consensus on the matter would paint the moral claim as an objective and natural property of our moral system. The universe would appear too indifferent and stagnant to object to our moral proceedings, instead, by virtue of dissenters and revolutionaries appealing to their personal and subjective sense of justice, we leave room for the fallibility of our moral systems.  I will thus ground my response in the non-naturalist view of moral realism which claims that while some moral concepts are reducible to natural concepts and objective properties, some cannot be accorded this property, and instead, I argue, can be attributed to the subjective beliefs and self-interests of moral agents. In this paper, I will argue that moral disagreement does not pose an insurmountable challenge to the realist given that the best explanation of the phenomenon incorporates both objectivist reducible natural properties, and relativist considerations of self-interest as dual driving forces for morality. I will present Enoch’s arguments for why non-naturalist realism can explain moral disagreement, followed by Mackie’s argument of inference by the relativist best explanation, and why it necessitates additional objective moral values, and provide some dialectical development of my view on a hybrid model of an objectivist and relativist non-naturalist realism as a solution to moral disagreement.

 

Firstly, we must ask ourselves, can the realists explain moral disagreements while preserving objective truths. Enoch holds that moral disagreements do not pose an insurmountable challenge to the realist because most moral disagreements amount to disagreement on the non-moral fact, individuals lack a complete knowledge on objective truths rendering disagreements a question of cognitive and logical shortcomings, and that self-interest complement and threaten our unadulterated obligation to the objective good. His first point stems from the fact that most moral disagreements are not the subject of meta-ethical debate, but rather a disagreement on non-moral facts that must be determined by other areas of study. Let’s take abortion as an example. When individuals disagree on the subject of abortion, there is rarely disagreement on our duty to protect the life of a being from being taken. What the debate often simmers down to is the point where the fetus becomes a sentient life, a question which must rely on the biological facts in order to determine. And yet, the disagreement isn’t so simple, because others charge with our need to protect the potentiality of life which in turn enters the realm of metaphysics as to when a collection of matter can be considered to be a potential for recognizable life. Just as two individuals who are tasked with pulling a lever in order to save lives may agree on the moral principle of saving as many lives as possible, there may be disagreement as to which lever saves the most lives as a consequence of incomplete information, rather than disagreement on the moral principle. Mackie objects to such parables when he refuses to compare the indeterminacy of meta-ethical objectivity to the disagreements on objective natural truths in the sciences for example. Partly, Enoch completes, because although we have methods of resolving such moral disagreements they don’t guarantee agreement, just as educating Nazi soldiers on the biological similarities between Jews and the ‘Aryan’ race wouldn’t be an epiphanous release from moral vilification. And partly, as Mackie posits these disagreements stem from environmental cues and subjective identification with them, rather than purely from different interpretations of objective moral truths as the realist would suggest. Thirdly, just because there exist objective moral truths, does not make them wholly and unavoidably authoritative, their existence doesn’t entail that people will solely draw on them to shape their moral opinions. Self-interest distorts obligations to objective moral truths, and at times, rightfully so. Sometimes this self-interest is in the immoral need to protect one’s ego against the disinterest of a young woman, and other times it serves to preserve the moral authenticity of an otherwise unrealistically selfless moral persona. If faced between the self-interest of visiting my sister in the UK, thus favoring my nucleic moral ties, or giving that money to charity instead, which the utilitarian would rightly argue secures a higher order of good, the choice seems simple enough. To some philosopher’s objections such as Singer or Hunger, I would feel no shame or failed moral duty, and yet the objective good was evidently giving my money to charity. Not only is relative self-interest a necessary component of an accurately descriptive meta-ethical theory, but it seems to be less dominant a moral concern the further the impact from the individual. If face with moral disagreement on the implication of a controversy about the nature of sub-particles as Enoch suggests, well experience less moral disagreement, and might I add, less contentious and insurmountable disagreement.  Our interests often align themselves with our moral inclinations like a slave owners’ financial investment in slavery will likely inspire the position of its moral sanctity. So how exactly does a relativist approach moral disagreement? 

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Mackie’s argument of inference by best explanation suggests that a relativist view that morality is inextricably linked and machinated by the subjective experiences of agents is a more parsimonious explication of moral disagreements than realism is. He posits that given individuals and communities often disagree on first and second-order ethical judgments, it would be more appropriate to acknowledge moral structures to be unique to the beliefs and held opinions of individuals and communities, rather than describing these moral disagreements as a deviation from an ascribed objective truth. He argues that individuals form their moral beliefs around the circumstances that afford themselves to this belief, just as an individual would support gun ownership because they themselves are gun owners, rather than becoming a gun owner as a consequence of reasoning on the objective value of gun ownership. Thus, Mackie suggests that the causal connection exists begins with the unilateral authority of the individuals’ perspectives and way of life, rather than the a priori authority that the natural property which gun ownership would objectively entail would hold. Moreover, any dissent from the moral environment that the individual resides in, such as a Nazi soldier resisting a commanding officers order rather than subscribe to the nationally held moral beliefs, would be an extension of a more basic principle, or moral axiom if you will, that we hold to a higher degree than the derivative rules the soldier dissented from. Mackie thus acknowledges that even though morality is a feature of relative experiences, a common objection that he must concede to is Sidgwick’s principle of universalizability which are basic moral principles held in all society to differing degrees. He extends, however, that once these principles are adopted by a society, they’re morphed around the circumstances and preferences of the unique culture, thus producing differing moral rules. Thus while dominantly subjective, there is nevertheless room for the non-naturalist realist to claim that such first-order principles carry with them an objectivity that surpasses personal preferences. 

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If such principles do exist, on the other hand, their original formations by the population first contending with them had to see a similar interjection between subjective self-interest and objective reasoning. Let’s assume such a principle is that of the right to be free from slavery, and that in the modern world, close to no one would contest this claim as an objective moral principle. In ancient Greece on the other hand, this seemingly objective moral fact was still the subject of common disagreement. This suggests that although objective moral facts behave independently of individual moral agents, we must hold that they are not absolute in order to explain the movement of moral facts from the category of contentious second-order ethical claims, to first-order universalizable ones over time. On the other hand, what if history were to move in reverse moral order, and as history progressed, moral disagreements further entrenched schisms surrounding moral principles such as the freedom of slaves, moving in the trajectory of increasingly dissonant and unrelated cultural moral frameworks. Not only does this reflect that historical development and consensus on universal moral facts requires that the authority of objective moral forces sway the forces of relative self-interest, but it also gives rise to a contingency. That of a self-correcting moral ecosystem that closes gaps in moral understanding as it is driven forward through time by the human venture of developing and advancing our moral frameworks, whether intentional or as a natural feature of moral agents seeking to pursue moral ends. Mackie suggests that moral systems are fueled by subjective moral experiences, and thus relativity is the hallmark of a meta-ethical explanation for moral ecosystems which entertain moral disagreements. However, by virtue of existing within a moral field where subjective moral judgments are subject to cross-examination and have causal consequences on other moral agents within this larger ecosystem, positive or negative, objectivity is a natural product of our understanding of morality. That is, whether individuals subscribe to this objectivity or not. This may seem evident in a habitual example, like when we refrain from stealing because the community’s relative moral code deems it immoral. But when we’re faced with a less established moral field to which we owe allegiance to like non-human animals or the international community, the clash between objective moral truths like our duty to preserve higher orders of good, be it in securing animal liberty by becoming vegan or aiding in the liberation of an apartheid state, and the subjective moral goods, like securing the moral interests of our appetites or the national interest of economic gain, becomes more evident. The inward subjective interests often clash with external and higher orders of objective goods that lie outside our immediate moral fields. But the question remains, do we need both an objective and a relative dimension to a good meta-ethical theory in order to tend to moral disagreements?  Well, if we judged a debate about western capitalist structures of eastern humanist systems of social organization like Bhutan’s national happiness index replacing the western national growth index, with the same scrutiny and normative ferocity as a question of modern-day slavery, we would end up with a massacre or an invasion in the name of freedom based on differing ideologies. Conversely, if we treated the question of human genocide of the Uighurs in China as lightly as we do different cultural values, we would be committing a grave injustice where objective consideration is visibly needed. The distinction between what constitutes first order and second-order moral phenomenon is needed, and the methods and systems for tending to their unique moral ailments ought to be as unique as their challenges. 

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Citations:
Enoch, David. “How Is Moral Disagreement a Problem for Realism?” The Journal of Ethics, vol. 13, no. 1, 2008, pp. 15–50., doi:10.1007/s10892-008-9041-z.

Feldman, Fred, and J. L. Mackie. “Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong.” The Philosophical Review, vol. 88, no. 1, 1979, pp. 23–30., doi:10.2307/2184791.