The question of non-human animals’ capacity to think is one that holds many implications on the nature of thought and consciousness. Are the two dichotomous or represent a spectrum on which human thought is but a point on this continuum. This paper will explore Descartes and Malcolm's interpretations of three distinct dimensions of the problem as well as my response to both philosophers' analyses. These three questions are the question of the distinction or contingency between thought and consciousness, whether thoughts consisting of propositional content and attitudes are to be considered paradigms of thought, and whether “thinking” and “holding thought” should be equated. These dimensions synthesize into a concrete answer on whether nonhuman animals are capable of thought, be it a Cartesian anthropocentric argument of the necessity of consciousness for thought (455), or Malcolm's claim that animals can have a form of thought even if we’re incapable of affirming it (460). I will first introduce Descartes’ account of the question of non-human animal thought followed by my conjectures and Malcolm's solution to the problem. 

 

Descartes’ arguments for non-human animals’ inability to think are derived from our inability to prove their thoughts given that “the human mind does not reach into their hearts”  (454) and that all forms of mental states require a propositional content and attitude (455). Descartes claims that thoughts are formed by propositional content and propositional attitudes and that all mental states, including pain, fear and anger, must have a proposition (455). A subtle assumption of this idea however is that Descartes uses this premise to predicate thought on self-consciousness. Descartes argues that “In order to have pain one must apprehend and affirm a proposition” and thus in order to have pain, one must have a necessary level of self-consciousness to recognize the self in relation to the proposition of pain, or in other words must be independent from the physical proposition itself (457). Human sensation transcends mechanic responses to objects like pain as a consequence of our ability to hold propositional content and attitude about the sentiment. A pain in the foot is not truly in the foot but rather a product of a mental state (457), and given Descartes’ claim that thoughts are “all those things that are in us consciously” (456) as well as his principle of thoughts as being “non-corporeal and nonspatial” (454), pain as a sentiment must not only be a product of our nonspatial mental states, but must also be contingent on our consciousness of it. Animals on the other hand are argued by Descartes as having purely mechanical responses to objects of pain. In Descartes’s analogy of the trustworthy friend “quickly thrust[ing] his hand against our eyes as if to strike us” and us reacting by closing our eyes, he proposes an example for “machine performances” as a model for animals’ physical reactions to pain (456). The analogy in relation to nonhuman animals argues that when these entities are maimed their bodies reflexively and instinctively react to the physical aspect of the pain without a mental registration of that pain. For in order for pain to hold a mental dimension in animals they would have to hold what Descartes characterizes as “second grade of sensation” (456). The second grade of sensation, according to Descartes, is what differentiates human sensation and nonhuman sensation, and is the “immediate mental results, due to the minds union with the corporeal organ affected” or in other words our “perceptions of pain” as propositional content and attitudes (456). Consequently, Descartes holds that animals are incapable of thought given their inability to produce propositional content and attitudes as well as their lack of consciousness. 

 

I propose that Descartes makes the false assumption of dichotomizing thought and forms of consciousness as either being present or absent. An amoeba can’t be expected to have the same mental capacities as a dog, that would be belittling of the dog or hyperbolizing the amoeba’s capacities. Animals display different forms of understandings of the world based on their functions, understandings which can be considered as thought. I will use Malcolm's argument that nothing “deserves to be regarded as the paradigm or prototype of thinking” (458) in order to make the assumption that learning through association, as a form of mental activity requiring a mediator independent from the physical environment (the thinker), must be a form of thought. Thus, even association as a form of thought, even if rudimentary cannot be rejected from being a form of thought. If non-human animals truly only experience pain physically rather than mentally as well, they wouldn’t be able to formulate opinions on that pain. Animals’ aversion to pain or attraction to pleasure are a product of an understanding of their relationship to pain or pleasure. Whether pain is good or bad can’t be surmised from a purely physical mechanism of cause and mechanic response, but rather it is necessary to be able to understand whether pain is an attractable experience or not. However, Descartes would contest by claiming that an animals’ aversion to pain belongs to the instinctual characteristics of “machine performances” (456). On the other hand, a survivalist instinct suggests a disposition towards survival and self-preservation, the mechanical dog, however, should be indifferent to the outcome of his life given that he holds no propositional attitude towards pain or death. The simple preference of life over death is something that is shared by all living things, and given Descartes’ position on the noncorporeal thoughts constituting the mind, this preference must be noncorporeal in humans. I could assume that this preference signals some form of thought in all living beings, but not only would I be unable to disprove it being a feature of the physical body, but I’d also have the burden of justifying amoebas as having some form of thought. On the other hand, given that this preference can be overturned in animals we consider more mentally complex such as beached whales and depressed humans, the will to live or survive can’t hold the universality that a purely physical explanation assumes. Descartes’ presumed account of survivalistic instinct as being contained within the thoughts of humans, would have to extend to the thoughts of animals with similar capabilities. Furthermore, in order for an animal to understand whether an object is a fearful object or not, knowledge of that object must be held, and consequently, a form of thoughtful association between the object and the sensation of danger is necessary for fear of it. Take the example of a dog seeing a lion at a distance for the first time. Would this dog exhibit fear if he has never seen a lion before? If not then the fear of the dog must be learned by association, a mental process, and Descartes's argument on fear being mechanical can’t stand. If yes, I see two options: The dog holds a survivalist instinct, in which case, as previously argued, this form of preference would represent a form of thought. The second is if the dog perceives the lion as being threatening through the association of his features (his grandiose stature, his large claws) to danger. This would involve a form of learned association, a phenomenon which distinguishes the learner from his physical environment given that he attributes a propositional content a distinct attitude of fear.

 

While Malcolm agrees with the Cartesian notion of our inability to affirm the thoughts in non-human animals, he contends that this argument isn’t sufficient grounds to deny them thought (460). Malcolm begins by arguing that thought can exist without consciousness (459). Descarte’s account of the sensation of passions (like pain or anger) as transcending physical causality as a result of holding propositional representations and attitudes towards the pain, in essence, recognize the need for consciousness in the holding of sentiments (457). To feel pain is physical, but the mental result in the form of propositional content is the awareness that “I am in pain”.  Malcolm responds by stating “It is plainly false that whenever a man is angry he thinks the proposition ‘I am angry’” and argues that passions like pain, anger or fear, are not dependent on awareness of the propositional content (459). Consequently, animals can feel these passions without the necessary consciousness Descartes expects in the experience of passions. The question, however, is: does the interpretation of experience without consciousness count as thought or not? Malcolm questions that even tho we have thoughts which have propositional content and attitudes, who is to say that this is the paradigm of thought (458). Why is the associative knowledge of animals not thought? Why does Malcolm's dog forming an attitude of hatred towards baths, and consequently associating the sight of the preparations for his bath to this negative attitude towards the bath and hiding as a result, not considered a form of thought (459)?  Is learning through association not a form of thought? Furthermore, Malcolm argues that Descartes wrongfully equates thinking with having thought (458).The subtle difference between the two is that the former happens independently from external verification of thought, the latter requires recognition of thought through linguistic means (459-460). This synonymity assumed in Descartes's argument provides an account for whether we can attribute thoughts to animals rather than whether they can think or not. Both Malcolm and Descartes agree on our inability to determine whether animals can think or not because they are incapable of language, and consequently we are incapable of determining whether the thoughts we attributed to their behaviors were truly held and considered by them or not (460). However, Malcolm argues that our reliance on language to surmise whether others have certain thoughts or whether they have thoughts at all is equally as problematic as our inability to surmise it in animals. We can’t accurately acknowledge people’s thoughts given that our inability to confirm whether what was spoken is an accurate representation of their thoughts or whether they truly held the thought they claim given that “thoughts are not linguistic entities” (459).   Moreover, say we take a human capable of speech, a mute person, and a dog and were to somehow remove the knowledge from the observer which is human and which is not, and watched them cross a slippery path. All of them walk precariously over the ice and we thus assume that they all thought the ice was slippery. However, whether or not they had the thought according to Descartes’ equating of thinking and having thoughts in determining whether they are capable of thought, would bring us to the conclusion that only the human capable of speech had thought. But just as it would be absurd and overly indulgent of philosophical suspension of disbelief that the mute person is incapable of thought, it would be equally absurd to deny the dog of the capacity of thought.  

 

I would to like to add a nuance to Malcolm's distinction between “The dog thought” and “the dog had the thought” (458). “Having the thought” as opposed to “thought” also comments on the dog's capacity to bring the thought about rather than simply having reactive thoughts to his environment. Self-consciousness and consciousness are two distinct human thoughts that highlight the crucial treatment of thoughts about the self as being independent of thoughts about the physical environment. This distinction allows us to choose our states of being and be the source of thoughts not directly affiliated to the present environmental circumstances. Having a perception of the self distinct from the present environment that we face means we can call upon experiences and knowledge we have attributed to the self when dealing with a situation. Self-consciousness grants us the ability to command thoughts independent from present circumstances. When Descartes’ statement that thoughts must be “conscious” (456)  is used to argue that animals lack self-consciousness and consequently must lack thought, the difference between self-conscious and conscious thoughts is undermined. Even if animals can’t bring about thoughts, a feature of self-consciousness, they are still conscious of their present environment and hold thoughts of their present circumstances.

 

Citations:

Rosenthal, David M. The Nature of Mind. Oxford University Press, 1991.