Is there a difference in kind between non-violent civil disobedience and violent resistance, or is it merely a difference in degree? When, if ever, is an individual faced with an unjust law justified in moving from non-violent disobedience to violent action?

 

This paper will use Rawls’ definition of civil disobedience as a “public, nonviolent, conscientious yet political act contrary to law” (Rawls 320) aimed at bringing about social change as opposed to violent resistance which differs in its ability to incite physical harm. The paper will explore the differing characteristics of civil disobedience and violent resistance but will argue that they are both different degrees of distrust in the state. I will then argue that when an individual is faced with an unjust law it is justified to move from non-violent disobedience to violent action, when he has exhausted legal means, acted under the premise of civil disobedience, and has then concluded that the state has overlooked its duty to justice and its constituents, deeming it an unjust state. The paper will establish this premise by first arguing why civil disobedience is no longer viable under an unjust state, second, why the conditions differ between civil disobedience and violent resistance, and third, the paper will consider counterarguments to the premise and respond to them. 

 

Although civil disobedience and violent resistance hold drastically different characteristics, they both originate from an initial opposition to a command from the state and differ only the level of distrust in the state. Civil disobedience according to Rawls is made to “warn and admonish” (322). It is designed to bring about social change by appealing to the sense of justice of the majority, ensuring their motives are perceived as earnest, be it through their willingness to accept legal consequences or by continuing to recognize the authority of the state and laws. Violent resistance, however, is by nature, the denouncing of the state’s authority (Rawls 323). Violent resistance is morally justified by the individual as existing outside the bounds of legality by denouncing the authority of the de jure state to make such legal claims. A violent resistor would not be willing to accept legal consequences because this would mean recognizing the authority of the opposition. On the other hand, civil disobedience is in itself a result of exhaustion of “legal means” (Rawls 327). In the process Rawls describes, civil disobedience is a higher degree of opposition to state law (Rawls 327). As the individual’s trust in the convictions of the state to make just decisions weakens, the individual loses trust in the state’s ability to make just decisions. In that sense, violent resistance is a response to an even weaker trust in the state, to the point where the minority loses belief in the state’s duty to uphold the principles of justice, and consequently, no longer recognizes its legal authority. An implication of the movement between civil disobedience to violent resistance is thus abjuring of the state’s claim of authority, when then is this transition justified?    

 

Before arguing why civil disobedience is incompatible with an unjust state, I will first delineate an assumption made. The assumption the disobeyers have exhausted legal means and acted under civil disobedience before exercising violent resistance is made to ensure that the intention behind the violent resistance is sincere in its efforts to bring about morally just socio-political change. Non-violent civil disobedience is usually preferred to invoke social change because it does not obstruct the message of the disobedient, does not convey a call to anarchy, rather a call for social change, and avoids state driven resistance to the claim of the ideological minority. In a theoretical unjust state, which “departs so widely from its own professed ideals” (Rawls 323), the state would have motivation to oppose the moral claims made, so much so that their conviction is no longer to the people and the justice it serves, but rather the convictions it holds. An oppressor with economic incentive, or who was educated in a system designed to undermine the claim of the ideological minority, might prioritize these incentives over their duty to justice, resulting in an unjust state. Civil disobedience, which relies on invoking a “commonly shared conception of justice that underlies the political order” (Rawls 321), would lose its efficacy in a community where these efforts are actively undermined by an ulterior driving force, such as economic gain, status, or power for example. When dealing with a state where a sense of justice and morality comes second to the aforementioned ulterior drivers, one cannot expect the success of their civil disobedience.      

 

Furthermore, the conditions underpinning civil disobedience and violent resistance must be different, and so they cannot be treated as interchangeable. When you're willing to violently resist you're representing a much greater number of dissenters than when civilly disobeying, and if the claims of the greater number are ignored, this reflects an indifference of the state towards their duties of service and justice. When a minority makes a claim that differs from the status quo a necessary condition for the change they want to incite in a democratic community is support from the majority or at the very least part of the majority. A violent claim, however, is no longer perceived as a purely political act, rather is seen as a threat to public or individual safety (Rawls 322), so regardless of the rationality behind the claims made, the support of the dissent is no longer purely support of the moral ideals behind the claim but a call to arms, decreasing the probability of support due to the effort needed to support a violent cause. Thus one must assume that the purpose of violent resistance, is no longer to call on the majority for support as well as oppose the state, but rather simply the opposition of an unjust state. If the minority no longer finds it beneficial to call upon the masses, this either means that they have enough support from the masses to contest the authority of the state, or they're indifferent of the support of the masses. Assuming that the goal of the resistor remains to bring about justice, the prior is more realistic, the state is unwilling to consider the claim being made by the masses, consequently disavowing their role of servitude to the people. According to Wolff, the government of a democratic state is “no more than a servant of the people as a whole” (22) and thus a state who is motivated to hold its convictions rather than consider the moral objectives of the large portion of civilly disobedient citizens, is a state which has departed “widely from its own professed ideals” (Rawls 323), affirming the state as an unjust state, and thus prompting violent resistance. 

 

Multiple arguments may arise as a result of these claims. First, according to Kant's categorical imperative, an action is wrong regardless of the consequence, and thus violence should be morally apprehensible regardless. However, Kant also considered men to be responsible for their actions regardless of where the command came from (Wolff 12), thus if we are conflicted between a morally apprehensible command and its opposition for the conservation of our metaphysical freedom and our duty to morality, the later would be the greater good. A second question may arise: What if the ulterior drivers grant the greater good? If economic benefits are far greater in scope than the momentary suffering of a minority, we are still acting at the expense of fundamental freedoms and principles of justice. There must exist given non-negotiable principles, otherwise, brief periods of slavery could be justified by economic prosperity. Regarding the growing number of supporters necessary to make a valid threat of violent resistance, the number of people supporting the cause could still represent a numerical minority, and the state’s duty is towards the majority. However, the state’s duty is to justice before the majority. Legal precedents, for example, are not voted on by the majority, but rather, by qualified and unbias judges. When made aware of the moral transgression being brought to light, the de facto state should make efforts to entertain the claim, if not, this reflects willfull ignorance to the claims of justice being made, and by consequence, reflecting an unjust state. 

 

In conclusion, although civil disobedience and violent resistance might differ in characteristics and circumstance in which they may arise, they are both different degrees of distrust in the state. Having exhausted the legal and non-violent course of actions, dissenters are still confronted with a larger number of supports given their appeal to an underpinning shared duty to justice, and an indifferent state which can no longer claim ignorance or falsehood of the claims. A state of this nature which if not motivated by a duty to the people or a duty to justice, is driven by an ulterior force, is consequently an unjust state, whom its constituents are morally obligated to oppose, in the manner most effective, and since non-violence loses its efficacy when dealing with such a state, that manner is violent in nature. 

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Bibliography:

Rawls, John. A Theory of Justice. The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1973.

Wolff, Robert Paul. In Defense of Anarchism. University of California Press, 1998.